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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
stockholders are readjusted, by amendment, consolidation
or otherwise, to the advantage of a controlling group or
class, it is believed that a court of equity may inquire into
the fairness of the proposed change and whether it serves
the interests of the corporation as a whole.20 Clearly, if
the unfairness of the plan is so gross and apparent as to
constitute fraud, the courts will interfere in spite of the
adoption of the plan in strict accordance with statutory and
charter provisions."
EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE ON REVO-
CATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR'S
LICENSE FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY JUDG-
MENT. ELLIS V. RUDY, COMMISSIONER.1
The petitioner-appellant's license to operate a motor
vehicle in the State of Maryland was suspended by the ap-
pellee-Commissioner of Motor Vehicles because he failed
"to satisfy a final judgment against him for damages on
account of personal injury resulting from the ownership,
maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle," within
30 days after it became final, as required by the Maryland
Financial Responsibility Law. Later the petitioner was
adjudicated a bankrupt and was granted a discharge in
bankruptcy. This was admittedly a defense to any fur-
ther action on the judgment. Petitioner applied for reissue
of his license on furnishing proof of financial responsibility.
The Commissioner refused on the ground that the statute
requires the license to remain suspended while the judg-
ment is "unstayed, unsatisfied and subsisting and until" it
"is satisfied or discharged and until proof of ability to re-
spond in damages for future accidents is furnished" and
held that a discharge in bankruptcy is not a satisfaction of
the judgment within the contemplation of the Act. The
petitioner brought a proceeding for a writ of mandamus
to compel the reissue of the license. The trial court sus-
tained a demurrer to the petition and petitioner appealed.
HELD: Reversed and remanded for issuance of writ.
20 See authorities cited Brune, op cit., p. 82.
*1 See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 88, 141 Atl. 425
(1928) ; Mortgage Bond Assn. v. Baker, 157 Md. 809, 145 Atl. 876 (1929);
Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 142 Atl. 885 (1928).
2- Md. -, 189 AtI. 281 (1937).
$Md. Code Supp., Art. 56, Sees. 187 to 18TR, Inel.
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
The Court expressly reserved its opinion on the general
validity of the statute, because upon their construction of it
the petitioner was entitled to his license. In view of the
Court's reservation of opinion, the validity of any provision
in the financial responsibility laws relating to motorists
may be subjected to future judicial scrutiny.
Apart from the question of bankruptcy, the validity of
a statute requiring a judgment debtor motorist to satisfy
a judgment within certain limits on condition of forfeiture
of his license to operate or permission to own a motor
vehicle is usually upheld as a valid exercise of the state's
police power and authority over the public highways.' So,
too, statutory provisions requiring proof of financial ability
to respond in damages as a condition to receipt of a license
to operate or register a car have been favorably reviewed
in advisory opinions of the highest courts of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire' and seem not to have been attacked.
The question of financial responsibility of motorists to
respond in damages to the public has received the attention
of several state legislatures.5 Some States require proof
of financial responsibility only of those persons deemed
most likely to be involved in accidents. Others require
proof of financial responsibility both from such persons
and those who have caused motor vehicle accidents without
satisfying judgments based thereon. Maryland" and New
York' are in this class. In addition, these statutes provide
that the judgment debtor must "satisfy" a prior judgment
arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. Still other
jurisdictions (Massachusetts and England 9) have gone the
entire way by requiring proof of financial ability to re-
spond in damages of every motorist before he is permitted
to drive a motor vehicle. In the principal case the court
3 See Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481
(1931) ; Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925). Munz
v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1933) ; Garford Trucking, Inc.,
v. Hoffman, 177 Atl. 882 (N. J. 1935) ; State v. Price, 63 Pac. (2) 653 (Ariz.
1937) ; Sheehan v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 Pac.
(2) 359 (1934).
1 Opinion of the Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 AtlI. 117, 39 A. L. R. 1023
(1925) ; Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680 (1925) ; and
see Opinion of the Justices, 171 N. E. (Mass.) 294, 69 A. L. R. 388 (1930):
Commonwealth v. Funk, 186 At. 65 (Pa. 1936).
5 See Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Liability Insurance (1930)
16 A. B. A. J. 362.
6 See e. g. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) Sees. 1561, 1590, 1609, as amended
by Conn. Pub. Acts 1931, Sees. 294a-300a; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1930),
Sees. 135, 119, 128, as amended by N. J. Laws 1930, c. 267, id. 1931, c. 169.
'Md. Code Supp., Sees. 187A, 187B.
8 N. Y. Cons. Laws, c. 71, "Vehicle & Traffic Laws," Sec. 94-B.
* Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 90, Sees. 84A44J; id. c. 175, See. 118A;
20 and 21 Geo. V., c. 48, Sees. 85-88 (1930).
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holds that construing the statute so as to require the sus-
pension of license to continue after discharge in bankruptcy
will frustrate the purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
This purpose is to release the bankrupt from all of his
provable debts1 ° and to relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness in order to enable him
thereafter to begin afresh free from obligations and liabili-
ties that have become heavier than he could discharge.
The Court construed the act so as to avoid the conflict since
there was no unequivocal expression of a different intention
by the legislature.
An act of the General Assembly12 now awaiting the Gov-
ernor's approval specifically declares that "discharge in
bankruptcy or under insolvency proceedings shall not re-
lieve such person . . . from the obligation to satisfy such
judgment before having his license renewed." If ap-
proved, its validity under the Federal Constitution 8 may
be questioned, in view of the policy of the Congress as
declared in the Bankruptcy Act. There is a conflict in the
decisions of the federal district courts of New York on the
validity of a similar provision in the Laws of New York.14
In Re Perkins," a decision by a single judge sitting in bank-
ruptcy, restrained a judgment creditor from transmitting
ai copy of an unsatisfied judgment to the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles. Munz v. Harnett" in which a three judge
court convened pursuant to Section 266 of the Judicial
Code17 refused to restrain the Commissioner from suspend-
ing the plaintiff's chauffeur's license and owner's registra-
tion certificate upon receipt of properly certified copies of
a judgment record showing that an unsatisfied judgment
arising out of a motor vehicle accident was outstanding
against him.
A discharge in bankruptcy has never been regarded as a
satisfaction of a judgment, but only bars the judgment
creditor's civil remedies to collect.18  The Financial Re-
10 Bankruptcy Act, Sees. 1 (12), 17 (U. S. 0., Title 11, Sees. 1 (12), 35).
11 Williams v. U. S, F. & G., 236 U. S. 549, 59 L. Ed. 713, 35 S. Ct. 289
(1915).
12 Md. Laws, 1937, Ch. 30; Md. H. B. 20, 1937 Session.
Is "The Congress shall have the power . . . to establish a uniform rule
of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-
out the United States." U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8.1 4 N. T. Vehicle & Traffic Law, Sec. 94B.
15 3 F. Supp. 697 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1933).
166 F. Supp. 158 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1933).
17 U S. C., Title 28, Sec. 380.
18 Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U. S. 559, 29 L. Ed. 994, 6 S. Ct. 855
(1886) ; and see cases cited by Parke, J. in Ellis v. Rudy, 189 Atl. 281, note
3, p. 283.
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
sponsibility statute does not require the judgment debtor
to pay in spite of his discharge, but provides that he shall
not drive or own a car unless he does pay. It is defended
on the ground that it will tend to cause owners and oper-
ators of motor vehicles to take pains to avoid having judg-
ments for negligent driving entered against them. This is
expected to reduce casualties on the road.1" The statute
has a tendency to require persons of inadequate means to
take out insurance, without going to the ultimate extreme
of requiring compulsory insurance of everyone, regardless
of his financial responsibility. This policy, too, is re-
garded as proper.20 A decision21 holding invalid a city
ordinance requiring dismissal of any employee who failed
to pay a judgment outstanding against him, irrespective
of a discharge in bankruptcy, is clearly distinguishable,
because "the ability to pay debts in general has no relation
to the qualifications of the bankrupt as a fireman. The
statute does not say that no discharged bankrupt shall drive
an automobile. " 2 2
Compare the decision of the Supreme Court holding in-
valid a state law enforcing an assignment of future wages
to secure a debt after the debtor has been discharged of
that debt in bankruptcy.3 The pending statutory provi-
sion purporting to change the rule of the principal case is
probably constitutional.24  But quaere if the present addi-
tional requirement that the motorist must also furnish
proof of financial responsibility if he satisfies the judgment
after 30 days, but not if he does so within 30 days,25 is valid.
Perhaps reasonable promptness in satisfying judgments
is as good a tangible manifestation of ability to do so as
would be the filing of a policy of liability insurance.
19 Munz v. Harnett, 8upra note 16 at 160.
20 Supra note 3.
21 In Re Hicks, 133 Fed. 739 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1905).
2 Patterson, J. in Munz v. Harnett, supra note 16 at 161.
23 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 78 L. Ed. 1230, 54 S. Ct. 695
(1934). Reviewed In (1934) 21 Va. L. Rev. 220.
1'See (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 870; (1933) 43 Yale L. J. 344; (1934) 19
Cornell L. Q. 278; (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 277.
Is Md. Code Supp., Art. 56, Sec. 187B.
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